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The City of Orem, Plaintiff, represented by Robert J. Church.
The defendant, James H. Brown, pro se.
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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Was it reversible error for the appellant to be prosecuted and convicted for a
violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-53 when that section of the code had been renumbered to
U.C.A. § 41-6A-701, despite the fact that the language of the newly renumbered statute
was virtually identical to the old section?
"For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine the confidence of the verdict." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d
913, 920 (Utah 1987).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-53
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-701
Utah R. Crim. P. 30
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 28, 2005, a semi-truck, that was exiting westbound, making a right hand
turn to go north, got stuck on a landscaping boulder as it was leaving the WalMart
parking lot in Orem, Utah. The truck and trailer completely blocked northbound traffic.
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The trailer was lodged on the rock and the front axle was lodged on the raised median in
the center of Sandhill Road. R. At 0018. Tr. at 6, 8. Officer Snyder, the first officer to
arrive on the scene, observed several northbound vehicles traveling around the semi in the
southbound lane and drive up and over the raised median to get back into the northbound
lane. R. at 0018. Tr. at 8. He felt this was unsafe so he parked his car, blocking traffic,
got out and proceeded to direct traffic into the WalMart and Home Base parking lots. R.
at 0018 Tr. at 8. Officer Snyder also set up five cones to assist in diverting traffic.
Officer Watson and Sergeant Nielson arrived and positioned their police cars in an
attempt to divert traffic. Between the officers, the cones and the police vehicles, officers
were attempting to direct traffic to go through the parking lot to the next exit "on the
north side of McDonald's, between McDonald's and Subway, or we were directing traffic
to go, to go south on Sandhill through the, the old ... Home Base parking lot to come out
of the, the village, I think its village something, apartments or something." R. at 0018 Tr.
at 8 -10.
The raised median continued from under the axle of the truck, north to the
intersection of University Parkway. Once the raised median began, a vehicle traveling
north in the southbound lane would never be able to pull into the northbound lane without
traveling over the raised median. R. at 0018 Tr. at 17.
Southbound traffic was heavy at the time, as was the rain. R. at 0018 Tr. at 8, 11.
Southbound traffic was forced to narrow to one lane to get by the accident. R. at 0018 Tr.
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at 11. Southbound traffic was backing up, with some cars traveling west, through the
"Home Depot" [Home Base] parking lot. R. at 0018 Tr. at 11. Northbound traffic was
also heavy. R. at 0030. Appellant supplemented the appellate record with a video tape
taken by a WalMart security camera. R. at 0028, 0029. The video tape focuses on the
parking lot. In the upper right hand corner, the tape shows the semi getting stuck and
blocking traffic. The tape confirms that traffic was heavy for both north and south bound
lanes. Prior to officers arrival, the tape shows dozens of vehicles turning east into the
WalMart parking lot, west into the Home Base parking lot or turning around and heading
south. R. at 0030. The tape is of poor quality and it is difficult to ascertain exactly when
the officers arrive and where they place their cars. After several minutes, the semi is no
longer in the picture frame. R. at 0030.
Officer Snyder conceded that based on his drawing in court - the placement of his
car and the cones, it may have appeared that traffic was being directed into the
southbound lane of travel. R. at 0018 Tr. at 21. However, he did not recall where Officer
Watson's or Sergeant Nielsen's cars were located and had he been able to remember, it
may have changed the perception of the drawing. R. at 0018 Tr. at 22, 29. What the intent
of the officers that day was to direct traffic into the two parking lots to the west or east of
the semi. R. at 0018 Tr. at 21. The tape shows that virtually dozens and dozens, if not
hundreds of vehicles turned into either parking lot or turned around and headed
southbound. R. at 0030.
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Officer Snyder's attention was drawn to appellant's car after he heard Officer
Watson and Sergeant Nielson yelling. R. at 0018 Tr. at 20. Officer Watson yelled to
Officer Snyder to stop the appellant's car. R. at 0018 Tr. at 32. Officer Snyder observed
the appellant's Nissan Altima traveling north in the southbound lane of travel, west of the
raised median. R. at 0018 Tr. at 20, 40. Southbound travel was heavy and it "appeared
like, like he would have to weave in and out of the traffic to get, to go more." R. at 0018
Tr. at 22.
Officer Snyder was able to stop the appellant's car and identified the appellant by
his driver's license. R. at 0018 Tr. at 22-23. Officer Snyder admitted to being frustrated
with the appellant, due to the rain, the traffic situation and the fact that officers had tried
their best to direct traffic into the parking lots. R. at 0018 Tr. at 20, 21, 25.
Appellant was issued a citation for a moving violation. The officer wrote on the
face of the citation "Fail to stop at Police road block 41-6a-904(l)(a)." R. at 0000.
Officer Snyder had an old code reference book that did not have specific language of the
traffic statutes. R. at 0018 Tr. at 24. He made the best educated guess as to what the
appropriate citation would be based on his limited information. R. at 0018 Tr. at 24.
At appellant's trial on May 18, 2005, the City amended the charge to Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-53 (as amended, 1953), Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway Exceptions. The trial court judge amended the face of the citation. R. at 0000. Tr. at 3.
Appellant was found guilty at trial. R. at 0008.
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On February 2, 2005, Senate Bill 5 took effect which caused Utah Code Ann. § 416-53 (1953, as amended) to be renumbered to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-701 (1953, as
amended.). Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway - Exceptions.
Appellant filed a timely appeal. R. 0009.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellee acknowledges that it made an error in prosecuting appellant for a
violation of U.C.A § 41-6-53 instead of the newly numbered U.C.A. § 41-6a-701, the
code section that was in effect at the time appellant received his citation. However, this
error was made in good faith. Not only did the prosecutor erroneously assume the new
statute had not gone into effect, but the trial court was mistaken as well. Despite the
mistake in prosecuting appellant under the old statute number, the elements and defenses
of the newly numbered section remained the same, albeit some of the language had been
moved within the body of the statute. Appellant was able to present all his evidence and
make his arguments. The judge listened to both the prosecution and defense. He reached
his decision based on all the evidence presented. Because it is unlikely that a different
outcome would have been reached had appellant been prosecuted for a violation of
U.C.A. 41-6a-701 instead of U.C.A. 41-6-53, a reversal is not warranted. For an error to
require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to
undermine the court's confidence in the decision of the trial court. Appellant cannot meet
that burden. Therefore, his conviction should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
1.

APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED WHEN PROSECUTED FOR A
VIOLATION OF U.C.A. § 41-6-53 DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT HAD
BEEN RENUMBERED TO U.C.A. § 41-6a-703.

The appellee concedes that it made a mistake when amending the citation to reflect
a violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-53. On the date of the trial, the code section in affect was
U.C.A. § 41-6a-703. The renumbering of the traffic section went into effect on February
2, 2005. However, the prosecutor, in good faith, mistakenly believed that it did not go
into effect until later in the spring, despite Mr. Brown's assertions otherwise. R. at 0018.
Tr. at 4. The trial court judge also assumed that the renumbering did not take effect until
later in the spring, after the date of appellant's citation. R. at 0018. Tr. at 4. The
appellant contends that he was prejudiced by this mistake. The appellee challenges this
argument.
During its period of enforcement, U.C.A. § 41-6-53 read as follows:
Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway - Exceptions.
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be operated upon the right
half of the roadway, except:
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same
direction under the rules governing this movement;
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the
center of the roadway, but the operator shall yield the right of way to all vehicles
travleing in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portions of the highway
within a distance constituting an immediate hazard;
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the
applicable rules; or
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic.
6

(2) On all roadways a vehicle proceeding at less than normal speed of traffic shall
be operated in the right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to
the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except when:
(a) overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction
or when;
(b) preparing for a left turn at an intersection or into a private road or
driveway.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-701 reads:
Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway- Exceptions
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a person operating a vehicle shall operate
the vehicle on the right half of the roadway, except:
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same
direction under the rules governing this movement;
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the
center of the roadway subject to the provisions of Subsection (2);
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the
applicable rules; or
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic.
(2) A person operating a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to a vehicle;
(a) travleing in the proper direction on a roadway; and
(b) that is within a distance constituting an immediate hazard.
(3) A person operating a vehicle on a roadway at less than normal speed of traffic
under the existing conditions shall operate the vehicle in the right-hand lane then
available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the
roadway, except when:
(a) overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction;
or
(b) preparing to turn left; or
(c) taking a different highway or an exit on the left.

To assist the court in comparing the old and new versions, the underline/strikeout
as presented on the legislative website is here presented, with the underline/italic sections
representing the newly added language and the strikeout the deleted language:
7

[41-6-53] 41-6a-701 Duty to operate vehicle on right side of roadway - Exceptions.
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a person operating a vehicle shall [be
operated upon] operate the vehicle on the right half of the roadway, except:
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same
direction under the rules governing this movement;
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the
center of the roadway [, but the operator shall yield the right of way to all vehicles
travleing in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portions of the highway
within a distance constituting an immediate hazard subject to the provisions of
Subsection (2)\
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the
applicable rules; or
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic.
[(2) On all roadways a vehicle proceeding] (2) A person operating a vehicle shall
yeild the right-of-way to a vehicle:
(a) traveling in the proper direction on a roadway; and
(b) that is within a distance consituting an immediate hazard.
(3) A person operating a vehicle on a roadway at less than normal speed of traffic
[under the existing conditions] shall [be operated] operate the vehicle in the right-hand
lane then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of
the roadway, except when:
(a) overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction
[or when];
(b) preparing [ftrra] to turn left [turn at an intersection or into a private road
or driveway], or
(c) taking a different highway or an exit on the left.

When the two statutes are compared, the language of U.C.A. § 41-6a-701 is almost
identical to its predecessor, U.C.A. § 41-6-53. The major difference is that the exceptions
of paragraph (b) of U.C.A. 41-6-53 have been moved and broken up into sub-paragraphs
and placed in paragraph (2) of U.C.A. 41-6a-701. Despite this change in location of the
language, both statutes still prohibit and allow the exact same behavior.
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The prosecution of appellant and presentation of the evidence of this case would
be identical under either version of the statute. The defenses available to the defendant
are identical under either version of the statute.
As previously admitted, the appellee made a mistake as to which version of the
statute it prosecuted. Rule 30 of the Utah Criminal Rules of Procedure states, "Any error,
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall
be disregarded." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30. It is the appellee's argument that the
mistake made in this case did not "affect the substantial right" of the appellant and should
be disregarded.
In State v. Knight, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the definition of "affect the
substantial rights of a party." Prior to 1987, Utah appellate courts had ruled that an error
warranted reversal "only if a review of the record persuades the court that without the
error there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant" Id.
At 919. (Quoting State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984), (quoting State v.
Hutchison 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added); see also State v. Valarde
734 P.2d 440 (1986). "We think the 'reasonable likelihood5 standard set forth in
Fontana, Hutchison,...[ and in] Velarde best explains Rule 30fs test for reversible error."
Knight at 919. The court went on to state that due to inconsistent standards in the past, it
would take the opportunity to "flesh out the meaning" of the phrase "reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result." Id.
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The Knight court looked to the U.S. Supreme Court for guidance. In defining a
similarly worded standard, the Supreme Court stated in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), "'A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." Knight at 920. While the
Supreme Courts interpretation of "reasonable probability" is not binding on Utah courts,
the Utah Supreme Court was persuaded that this definition was substantively identical to
"reasonable likelihood" in determining when reversible error has occurred Id. "Rules
that govern criminal proceedings are meant to ensure that a trial is a search for truth and
that the verdict merits confidence. It is entirely consistent with this aim to require that
when error has eroded a reviewing court's confidence in the outcome of a particular trial,
we should start over and conduct a new trial." Id.
In this case, all of the facts came out. The appellant was able to present all of his
facts as well as present his defense of being allegedly directed into the left hand travel
lane. The appellee, in his direct of Officer Snyder, even raised the issue of a possible
defense. "...I'll play devils advocate with you for a minute. It looks like you were
directing traffic into the southbound land..." R. 0018. Tr. At 21. Officer Snyder agreed,
that based on his diagram of where he placed his car and cones, it could be interpreted
that way. However, since he was not sure where the other officers had placed their cars,
he could not completely agree that it would appear that northbound traffic was being
directed into the southbound lane. Officer Snyder was very specific in stating that the
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goal was to direct traffic into either the east or west parking lots. R. 0018. Tr. At 21.
When reviewing the video tape that appellant placed into the record, it is abundantly clear
that virtually all other cars understood that they were not being directed into the
southbound lane of travel, but rather were being directed into the east or west parking
lots. R. 0030. Finally, appellant states that he was prejudiced by not being able to present
a defense to the new statute. However, he fails to cites to any specific facts he was
unable to present or how that evidence would have changed the verdict of the trial. He
has simply made a broad sweeping statement with nothing to support his argument.
"For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict. This is certainly above the
'mere possibility' point on the spectrum. If it is 'more probable than not' that the
outcome of trial would have been different, then a court cannot possibly place confidence
in the verdict. Furthermore, thoughtful reflection suggests that confidence in the outcome
may be undermined at some point substantially short of the 'more probable than not'
portion of the spectrum. It may not be possible to define 'reasonable likelihood' much
more explicitly than this, but the foregoing should be of some assistance in deciding
whether an error requires reversal."
Knight at 920.
While it was error on the City's part to amend the charge to the old code section, it
was not an error that meets the Knight requirement for reversal. The likelihood of a
different outcome is not sufficiently high to undermine the confidence of this verdict.
Even under the provisions of U.C.A. § 41-6a-701, appellant would not prevail based on
the facts of this case. He admits to driving on the left-hand side of the roadway. The only
exception to this rule that would allow defendant to drive in the left hand lane is two-fold.
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First, he must yield the right of way to south-bound traffic and second, he must yield the
right of way to vehicles that are within a distance constituting an immediate hazard.
Had he continued traveling north in the southbound lane of travel, it would have
been impossible for him to yield the right of way. There was no where for him to pull
over and yield without committing further moving violations. The raised median
continued from under the truck all the way to the intersection of Sandhill Road and
University Parkway. On-coming traffic would have been forced to maneuver around him,
effectively yielding their right-of-way to the appellant. Officer Snyder confirmed this
when he stated that to continue northbound, appellant would have had to "weave in and
out of traffic." R. at 0018. Tr. at 22.
One way appellant could have yielded the right-of-way to on-coming traffic would
have been to drive over the raised median and get back into the northbound lane of travel.
Driving over a median is illegal. U.C.A. § 41-6a-712. The other option would have been
to drive across all southbound lanes of travel, cutting off southbound traffic, and park on
the shoulder. This too, is an untenable alternative.
Because the error in this case did not affect the outcome of the trial, the error
should be deemed harmless. As such, a reversal is not warranted. State v. Verde 770
P.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989) see e.g. State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 (1988); Knight at 919-20;
State v. Cloud 722 P.2d 750, 754-55 (Utah 1986); State v. Nichols, 76 P.3d 1173, 1182
(Utah 2003).
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In searching Utah case law for cases on point, the appellee was unable to find any
local authority. However, in the State of New York, a trial court faced a similar situation.
In State v. Pena, 552 N.Y.S.2d 543, N.Y.City Crim Ct.,1990, defendant was tried for
reckless driving under a New York statute that had been previously renumbered. After
the state's first witness had testified, the defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that
the accusatory instrument failed to properly charge a crime. The court denied defendant's
motion and granted the people's motion to amend concluding that the new section was
unchanged when the new law was enacted. Accordingly, the factual allegations sufficient
to prove reckless driving under the previously numbered section were the same under the
new numbering system. Pena at. 544.
The same can be said of this case. While the numbering and some of the words of
the U.C.A. § 41-6a-701 have been changed from U.C.A. 41-6-53, the new code section
prohibits the same actions as well as providing the same defenses. Therefore, appellant
was not prejudiced and his conviction should be affirmed.
II.

APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS.
Appellant contends that his due process rights were violated by being treated

differently than other similarly situated defendants. To support his argument, appellant
cites to State v. Mohi 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995), claiming that the traffic code, as applied
to appellant and other similarly situated defendants was not applied uniformly.
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In Mohi, defendant, a juvenile, was prosecuted as an adult under the direct-file
provisions of state code. Under the language of the statute, he could also have been
charged as a juvenile. The decision whether to charge him as an adult or juvenile was left
to the prosecutor. In addition to this and other considerations, the fact that the same
conduct would receive such dissimilar penalties depending on which court defendant was
prosecuted in led the court to conclude that the law was not uniformly applied. Mohi at
1004.
In this case, other than a number, there was no dissimilarity between appellant and
other similarly situated defendants charged with the same offense. As discussed above,
the prohibitions, exceptions and defenses did not materially change between the old and
new numbered statutes. The penalties for violating the old numbered statute versus the
new numbered statute did not change.
Due process requires that the prosecution prove every element of the charged
statute. State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 195 (Utah 1995). To obtain a conviction under
U.C.A. 41-6-53, appellee had to prove that appellant operated his vehicle on the left-hand
side of the road without a valid exception. The exceptions are:
(a) "when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction
under the rules governing that movement;"
(b) "when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the center of
the roadway, but the operator shall yield the right of way to all vehicles traveling in the
proper direction upon the unobstructed portions of the highway within a distance
constituting an immediate hazard;"
(c) "on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the applicable
rules; or"
14

(d) "on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic."
U.C.A. 41-6-53.
To obtain a conviction under U.C.A. 41-6a-701, appellee must prove that appellant
operated his vehicle on the left-hand side of the road without a valid exception. The
exceptions are:
(a) "when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction
under the rules governing that movement;"
(b) "when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the center of
the roadway, subject to the provisions of Subsection (2);
(c) "on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the applicable
rules; or"
(d) "on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic."
(2) A person operating a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to a vehicle;
(a) "traveling in the proper direction on a roadway; and"
(b) "that is within a distance constituting an immediate hazard.
U.C.A. 41-6a-701
There is no difference in the proof that appellee must show. There is no difference
in the defenses appellant may provide. To say he was prejudiced for being prosecuted
under the old numbered statute is not supported by the language of the statute itself.
Due process also requires that a defendant be advised of the charge and provided
notice. Via e-mail, appellant was notified that appellee would be prosecuting him for a
violation of U.C.A. 41-6-53. R. At 0018. Tr. At 3. Appellant did not dispute this fact
that he had been put on notice. Appellee does not dispute that appellant informed
appellee that the statute had been renumbered but as has been set forth, appellee thought
that appellant was wrong. Nevertheless, appellant was put on notice of the appellee's
intent.
15

III.

THE APPELLEE DID NOT ENGAGE IN UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR.
Appellee accuses the appellant of engaging in unethical behavior for prosecuting

him for a violation of U.C.A. 41-6-53. Appellant states "... Mr. Church had at this point
already prosecuted numerous offenses under the 6a revision that occurred before
[emphasis in original] the incident in question here." Appellant's brief at 6. There are no
facts in the record to support this allegation. Because there are no facts in the record, the
appellee is forced to speculate as to what appellant is referring to.
Since appellant would only have access to the court's public filings, the
assumption is that is where he obtained his information. When the change in the traffic
code numbering system went into effect, it is likely that the state court computer system
was updated to reflect these changes1. The prosecutor would have had no participation in
making these changes nor was he aware that any change in the court's computer system
had been made. Once a change to the state court computer system was made, Mr.
Church's name would be automatically attached to cases he prosecuted per the court's
computer system.
It makes no sense for a prosecutor to create this type of appealable problem for
himself, especially if he consciously knew that the code had been renumbered. When the
prosecutor amended the code section in open court, he honestly believed that was the

1

Despite Mr. Church's amending the charge to the old number and the judge
granting the motion, when defendant's conviction is researched on the state court
computer system, it appears as a conviction for violating U.C.A. § 41-6a-701.
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section that was in effect at the time the appellant committed the offense. R. At 0018.
Tr. At 4. Further, the trial court judge also assumed that the renumbering did not take
effect until later in the spring, after the date of appellant's citation. R. at 0018. Tr. at 4.
Therefore, to imply that the prosecutor consciously knew that he had prosecuted other
defendants under the renumbered system but intentionally treated appellant differently is
without merit or proof.
CONCLUSION
Despite the honest error of the appellee, appellant was not prejudiced when the
trial court judge found him guilty. The language of U.C.A. 41-6a-701 is virtually
identical to that of its predecessor, U.C.A 41-6-53. The newly renumbered section
prohibits the same actions and provides the same defenses. A trial is a search for truth.
The truth was presented at trial, both through the appellant's and appellee's witnesses.
While the error of prosecuting appellant under an old code section may cause this Court
some pause, it is not the type of error that requires reversal. For an error to be reversible,
the likelihood of a different outcome at the trial level must be sufficiently high to
seriously undermine the confidence in the trial court verdict. That is not the case here.
Therefore, this Court should affirm appellant's conviction.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of March, 2006.

ROBERTXCHURCH
Orem City Prosecutor
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James Brown
Pro Se Appellant
255 W. 2000 S.
Orem, UT 84058
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